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QUANTUM MERUIT RECOVERY IN DIVORCE LITIGATION

Contingent fees, which are neither unreasonable' nor contrary
to public policy,2 are recognized as valid in all types of litigation
except divorce proceedings. Contingent fees are illegal in divorce
proceedings3 because of the policy that reconciliation should be encouraged by the courts. Therefore a fee based on the amount of the
separation award runs counter to that policy. 4 Additionally, the justification for contingent fee arrangements, that it allows one who could
not otherwise afford counsel to procure adequate representation by an
attractive fee arrangement, 5 is not applicable to divorce proceedings.
In divorce litigation the husband is held accountable for the reasonable value of the services performed by counsel on behalf of the
spouse. 6
When the contingent fee contract in divorce proceedings is declared
void for illegality, there is a conflict as to whether the attorney may
nevertheless, recover in quantum meruit the reasonable value of the
services rendered. 7 Only fourteen jurisdictions have dealt with the
problem and a slight majority allow recovery in quantum meruit,8
'Jeffries v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., lO U.S. 3
(1884); Shouse v. Consolidated
Flour Mills Co., 128 Kan. 174, 277 Pac. 54 (1929); Jones v. Jones, 333 Mo. 478, 63
S.W.2d 146 (1933). Contingent fees have never been recognized as valid in any type
of litigation in two jurisdictions: Sherwin Williams Co. v. J. Mannos & Sons, Inc.
287 Mass. 304, 191 N.E. 438 (1934); Wild v. Simpson, 2 K.B. 544 (CA. 1919).
'E.g., if the attorney-client contract prohibited the client from settling the suit.
Moran v. Simpson, 42 N.D. 575, 173 N.W. 769 (1919), the fee was contingent upon
successful prosecution of a criminal action. Baca v. Padilla, 26 N.M. 223, 19o Pac.
730 (1920).

3See e.g. Newman v. Freitas, 129 Cal. 283, 61 Pac. 9o7 (1900); Jordon v. Kittle,
88 Ind. App. 275, 15o N.E. 817 (1926); Ownby v. Prisock, 243 Miss. 203, 138 So. 2d
279 (1962).

"Jordan v. Westerman, 62 Mich. 170, 28 N.W. 826 (1886); Evans v. Hartley, 57
Ga. App. 598, 196 S.E. 273 (1938).
'.Lipscomb v. Adams, 193 Mo. 53o, 91 S.W. lO46 (19o6).
OSee e.g. IND. ANN. STAT. § 3-1216 (Bums repl. 1962); ORE. REv. STAT. 107.090,
107.100 (Supp. 1966).
7Ownby v. Prisock, 243 Miss. 203, 138 So.2d 279 (1962). Contra, Baskerville v.
Baskerville, 246 Minn. 496, 75 N.W.2d 762 (1956).
8
McConnell v. McConnell, 98 Ark. 193, 136 S.W. 931 (1911). Wiley v. Silsbee, 1
Cal. App. 2d 520, 36 P.2d 854 (1934); Wall v. Lindner, 410 P.2d 186 (Colo. 1966);
Evans v. Hartley, 57 Ga. App. 598, 196 S.E. 273 (1938); In re Sylvester, 195 Iowa 1329,
192 N.W. 442 (1923); McCurdy v. Dillon, 135 Mich. 678, 98 N.W. 746 (19o4) (distinguishing Jordan v. Westerman, 62 Mich. 170, 28 N.W. 826 (1886)); Ownby v.
Prisock, 243 Miss. 203, 138 So. 2d 279 (1962); Lynde v. Lynde, 64 N.J. Eq. 736,

1967]

CASE COMMENTS

361

while a minority hold that a contingent fee contract so taints the
attorney-client relationship that the attorney is not entitled to any

recovery. 9

In Hay v. Erwin,'0 the Supreme Court of Oregon adopted the
majority view and allowed recovery in quantum meruit. Erwin was
a declaratory judgment action to determine the amount of fee due to
an attorney working on a contingent fee basis in a divorce action. In
March 1962, Erwin, as attorney, filed for divorce on behalf of Mrs.
George Van Vleet. In June 1963, while the divorce suit was pending,
Erwin requested Mrs. Van Vleet to sign a letter of agreement whereby
she agreed to pay Erwin a contingent fee based on any sums recovered." In September 1963, Mrs. Van Vleet and her husband entered
into a complete property settlement, and a decree of divorce was
awarded in October 1963. Erwin contended that he was entitled to
a fee of $5o,ooo based upon the contingent fee agreement. Pursuant
to the decree of divorce the funds constituting the settlement were
deposited in court. The Clerk of the County Court, brought this
declaratory judgment action to determine how the funds should be
distributed. The trial court voided the contingent fee arrangement
52 At. 694 (sgo2); Van Vleck v. Van Vleck, 21 App. Div. 272, 47 N.Y. Supp. 47o

(1897); Overstreet v. Barr, 255 Ky. 82, 72 S.W.2d 1014 (1934).
The case of Lynde v. Lynde, 64 N.J. Eq. 736, 52 At. 694 (1902) is of particular
interest. This case reached the U.S. Supreme Court on the question of whether
New York was required to enforce a New Jersey judgment as to future alimony.
Lynde v. Lynde, 181 U.S. 188 (19o). It was held that the award for future alimony
was not a final judgment, being subject to modification in New Jersey and that the
provisions of the decree relating to bond, sequestration and injunction were in the
nature of execution, not of judgment and could have no extraterritorial effect. In
connection with this divorce litigation, the attorney, Westervelt, instituted a total
of ten suits and appeals dating from 1896 to goi. A settlement was finally made
in the amount of $41,ooo.oo. Asserting a contingent fee agreement Westervelt
notified Mrs. Lynde that her share would be about $19,ooo.oo. Mrs. Lynde objected and invoked the aid of the court. The court adopted the majority view and
remanded for a determination of what would constitute a reasonable fee for the
services rendered by Westervelt.
OBrindley v. Brindley, 121 Ala. 429, 25 So. 751 (1899); McCarthy v. Santangelo,
137 Conn. 410, 78 A.2d 240 (1951); Baskerville v. Baskerville, 246 Minn. 496, 75
N.W.2d 762 (1956), overruling Klampe v. Klampe, 17 Minn. 227, 163 N.W. 295
(1932); Jordan v. Westerman, 62 Mich. 170, 28 N.W. 826 (1886); Wagner v. Shelly,
241 Mo. App. 259, 235 S.W.2d 414 (1950). See Sobieski v. Moresco, 143 So. 2d 62
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1962); National Bank v. Holland, 19o Pa. Super. 501, 154 A.2d
252 (1959); Roller v. Murray, 112 Va. 780, 72 S.E. 665 (1911).
2"419
P.2d 32 (Ore. 1966).
"The agreement provided for the following payment: a) 33 1/3% of all property
or monetary award if the case is settled before trial b) 4o% of all property or
monetary award if the case is tried c) 50% of all property or monetary award if
the case is appealed. Brief for appellant at io, Hay v. Erwin, 419 P.2d 32 (Ore. 1966).
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and found that Erwin was entitled to a reasonable fee for his services,
in the amount of $0,000.
The attorney argued that the public policy against contingent
fees did not apply in the present case because the attorney-client
contract was not entered into until a year and three months after the
divorce suit was filed, thus the contract was not "promotive of divorce
or discouraging to reconciliation."' 2 The court rejected this argument
and adopted the
"[G]eneral rule that, where a contract made between an
attorney and client for the prosecution of an action is champertous,' 3 the attorney may recover from the client on the
point of quantum meruit for services rendered, in the same
,,14
manner as if the unlawful agreement had never existed ....

Thus, Erwin rejected the view that "'the taint of illegality permeates
the entire lawyer-client relationship in a divorce action so that every
objection to permitting a recovery on the express agreement applies
with equal force to an attempted recovery in quantum meruit.' ,15
Under the majority view, as adopted in Erwin, the attorney is
denied his contingent fee because such a fee violates the policy favoring reconciliation. The wisdom of requiring the attorney to promote
reconciliation is doubtful. An attorney is neither disposed toward nor
qualified to act as a marriage counselor. Good divorces are better
than bad marriages 16 and the attorney may firmly believe that it
is in the best interest of the client not to pursue reconciliation.' 7 As
a general public policy, reconciliation is a desirable goal, but in a
"An analogous situation wa. tonsidered by the New York County Bar Association, which held that it was proper for a lawyer to accept a percentage of the
alimony accrued prior to his retainer but improper as to alimony accruing subsequent to his retainer. Smedley, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY PROBLEMS IN FAMILY

57. The distinction being that the lawyer's interest in the accrued alimony
is not such as to inhibit reconciliation. Erwin declined to draw the distinction
between accrued and future alimony, and chose to find contingent fee contracts
in divorce litigation void per se, perhaps with the view that the prophylactic
result would be to discourage such future agreements.
"Black's Law Dictionary 292 (4th ed. 1951). "The purchase of an interest in
a thing in dispute with the object of maintaining and taking part in the litigation."

LAW,

149 P.2d at 34.

GIbid, citing Baskerville v. Baskerville, 246 Minn. 496, 75 N.W.2d 762, 773
(1956).
1
Harper and Harper, Lawyers and Marriage Counselling, I J. Family Law 73,
74 (1961).
T
2 There is a trend toward recognition that it is sometimes in the best interests
of society that parties be separated rather than reconciled. This is best illustrated
by the modem trend toward liberalization of the divorce laws. N.Y. DoM. RE. §
200.
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given instance it may not be in the best interest of one or both of
the parties, and it is the client the attorney represents. 8 Reconciliatory
pursuits are more properly left to marriage counselling agencies working in conjunction with the courts. 19
But even assuming that an attorney should be required to work
for reconciliation, the majority view adopted in Erwin, fails to adequately promote this policy. Under the Erwin view an attorney is
able to contract for an attractive contingent fee arrangement with
full knowledge that if the client should object, the attorney may at
least recover in quantum meruit. Such action on the part of the
20
attorney does a disservice to the legal profession since it is unethical.
Little public trust and confidence can be engendered in the bench
and bar if an attorney is permitted to enter into an illegal agreement,
and is nonetheless permitted a reasonable recovery. The Erwin view
seems unsatisfactory but the minority view also has undesirable effects.
The leading case denying recovery in quantum meruit is McCarthy
v. Santangelo.21 In that case the attorney entered into an agreement
whereby his compensation was to be one-third of any alimony the
court might award. The attorney conceded the agreement was void
as against public policy but nevertheless sought recovery in quantum
meruit. McCarthy recognized that the services rendered were faithful
and diligent, but pointed out that "the agreement created an inducement to him to advise, for his own financial gain, the immediate institution of an action for divorce, without giving thought or attention
to the possibility of reconciliation." 22 Consequently, the entire agreement was tainted by the illegality, and the attorney was not allowed
to recover in quantum meruit.
The minority view, as exemplified by McCarthy, tacitly applies the
equitable doctrine of "clean hands" and bars the attorney from recovering in quantum meruit. 23 The doctrine means that equity will not
S"An attorney is obligated to advise his client as to the best interests of the
client as seen by the attorney. In many divorce cases ... the best interest of one
or the other or even of both parties will be promoted by the divorce. If the
attorney honestly believed that the best interest of his client would be prejudiced
by a reconciliation, it was, in the opinion of the committee, entirely proper for
him to advise his client to that effect." Smedley, supra note 12, at 3o.
IDN.Y. Dof. RE. § 215; S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-110, § 20-110.1 (1962).
ANN. § 20-110, § 20-110.1 (1962).

mState v. Dunker, 16o Neb. 779, 71 N.W.2d 502 (1955); In re Smith, 42 Wash.
2d 188, 254 P.2d 464 (1953).
2137 Conn. 410, 78 A.2d 240 (1951).
24Id. at 242.
2The Erwin line of cases rejects this view by holding that where the only basis
for the contract's illegality rests upon the method of determining compensation,
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lend its aid to one who has been guilty of unlawful or inequitable
conduct in the matter in which he is seeking relief.24 Courts adhering
to the minority rule hold that the policy which dictates denial of
recovery on the contract itself similarly demands a denial of quantum
meruit recovery. 25
[T]he law will not imply a promise to pay for services which
are in derogation of public policy, any more than it will enforce
a specific contract having that object in view; and when a
plaintiff can not establish his cause of action without relying
on an illegal contract, or on services which by their very nature
26
contravene public policy, he cannot recover.
McCarthy, thus provides a strong prophylactic remedy for contingent fee contracts in divorce actions, but it also unjustly enriches
the client who is not thereby required to pay for services received. The
client fully expected to pay for the attorney's services, and if they
were performed faithfully27 the client has received what he bargained
for.28 The wrong done was not to the client, but to the legal profession,
and the general public, the former by being subjected to dishonor and
embarrassment, and the latter by its loss of confidence in our judicial
this form of illegality is not deemed to permeate the entire contract. Hay v. Edwin,
419 P.2d 32, 34 (Ore. 1966); Accord, McConnell v. McConnell, 98 Ark. 193, 136 S.W.
931 (1911); Wiley v. Silsbee, i Cal. App. 2d 520, 36 P.2d 854 (1934); In re Sylvester,
195

Iowa

1329, 192 N.W. 442 (1923).

2Taylor v. Grant, 204 Ore. io, 279 P.2d 479 (1955). The doctrine has nothing
to do with the rights or liabilities of the parties but rather with the public interest
and the maintenance of the integrity of the courts. Gaudioso v. Mellon, 269 F.2d
873 (3rd Cir. 1959). Mclintock, EQUITY 62 (2d ed. 1948), says: "No general statement
as to what will amount to unclean hands can be made, other than that it is conduct
which the court regards as inequitable. Almost always the violation of any statute will
make a party's hands unclean." He also says: "A party to a contract which is
void for illegality cannot, of course, obtain relief with respect thereto in equity
any more than he can at law; in either forum the parties will be left in the situation
in which they have placed themselves .... " Id. at 6o.
nMcCarthy v. Santangelo, 137 Conn. 410, 78 A.2d 240 (1951).
26
Barngrover v. Pettigrew, 128 Iowa 533, 1o4 N.W. 9o4 (19o5).
'Faithful and diligent service in this context refers not to the fact he may
have been mistaken about the illegality of the contract, but rather to a finding
that the attorney, notwithstanding the contract, properly represented the interests
of his client. See McCarthy v. Santangelo, 137 Conn. 410, 78 A.2d 240 (1951).
"See "The underlying theory of the doctrine is that, where one expends money
and labor in the improvement of the property of another on faith of an unenforceable contract, he is, upon repudiation of the agreement... entitled to be reimbursed...." Hardgrove v. Bowman, io Wash. 2d 136, 116 P.2d 336, 337 (1941). "Doctrine of 'unjust enrichment' is that person shall not be allowed to profit or enrich
himself inequitably at another's expense." McCreary v. Shields, 333 Mich. o0, 52
N.W.2d 853, 855 (952).
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system. It seems just that both groups should, in some manner, be
29
compensated.
The courts might preserve the strong prophylactic effect of McCarthy, while eliminating its unjust enrichment aspect, by requiring
the client to pay a reasonable fee for the services to the courts, rather
than to the attorney. The attorney is an officer of the court and could
be deemed estopped, by his misconduct, from benefiting from the
transaction. Funds so collected could be used to help finance marriage
counseling, legal assistance programs, or other worthwhile endeavors. 30
This solution seems more equitable than the existing law and
would provide the needed prophylaxsis since attorney's would be less
likely to enter into such agreements knowing they may recover nothing
for their services.
STEWART ROGER FINDER

nWilhelm v. Rush, 18 Cal. App. 2d 366, 63 P.2d 1158 (1937); Sobieski v. Maresco,
143 So. 2d 62 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1962); State v. Dunker, 16o Neb. 779, 71 N.W.2d
502 (1955).
nVhile enacting legislation might be desirable it does not appear to be
essential for the implementation of such a policy. An attorney is an officer of the
court, and contingent fees are subject to the supervision of the court. National
Bank v. Holland, i9o Pa. Super. 5Ol, 154 A.2d 252 (1959). "They, [attorneys] like
judges, clerks, and sheriffs, are a part of the machinery of the law created for the
administration of justice .... If payment is made by him to the opposing solicitor,
it is made to an officer of the court, and in a broad sense is paid into court,-as
truly so as if paid to the clerk." Lynde v. Lynde, 64 N.J. Eq. 736, 52 At. 694, 697
(1902).

